the legitimacy of the initiative, 9 or the import of defining the state as "a Jewish and democratic state". 10 However, the academic world quickly redirected its focus, now concentrating on the specific constitutional innovations, and their influence on Israeli law in various areas.
11
Notwithstanding the broad academic discourse of the process that merited the appellation "constitutional revolution", one niggling question remains conspicuous in view of the dearth of legal literature dealing with it: how did it happen? How is it that after 44 years of failures and parliamentary paralysis, one bright morning the Knesset suddenly rose to the occasion and anchored a bill of rights in Basic Laws? What were the circumstances that combined to make possible that which had long been regarded as impossible?
12
In this article I examine four possible explanations of the phenomenon. The first thesis attributes it to the successful exploitation of a constitutional moment that transpired as a result of a severe erosion of public trust in the political branches. At that constitutional moment all those involved internalized the pressing need for a change in the balance of powers and the necessity to fortify the supervisory powers of the court. The second thesis pins the success to the tactics adopted by the initiators of the law. Instead of insisting on the adoption of a full-fledged bill of human rights, they broke down the charter into smaller units and enacted only those parts on which there was consensus. In addition, in general the initiators adopted a conciliatory approach that bridged the ideological chasms among the various parties. According to the third thesis, adoption of these laws was enabled by the fact that the initiators of the procedure were less than entirely candid, and failed to expose the full import of the proceeding they had led, thereby lulling the traditional opponents of the process into a false sense of security. According to this explanation the mistake was compounded by the almost total absence of meaningful constitutional discussion in Israel, which translated into general ignorance regarding the implications of the adoption of a constitutional bill of rights. According to the fourth, and final, explanation the success of the initiative stemmed from two transitions in the Israeli political reality. The first was the Labor party's loss of 9 See e.g. Eli Salzberger, Constituent Authority -"Two Notes on Incidental Comments, or an Invitation for Renewed Discussion, 3 LAW AND GOV'T IN ISRAEL 679 (1996) [Hebrew] . 10 See e.g. the collection of articles in 19 TEL-AVIV U. L. REV. 11 There is no point to name all the many articles. For A compilation of the articles dealing with the effect of the Basic Laws on the various areas of Israeli Law see Aharon Barak, The Constitutional Revolution -Bat Mitzvah, 1 MISHPAT VE-ASAKIM 3 fns. 151-157 (2004) [Hebrew] (hereinafter: Barak -Constitutional Revolution) . 12 In an article published soon after the passage of the Basic Laws, Claude Klein notes that "The paths of the Israeli democracy and its legislators are strange. Is there any serious observer who one year ago, would have risked anticipating the passage of those laws?" Claude Klein, 1 HAMISHPAT 123 [Hebrew] .
hegemony and the uncertainty regarding the future identity of the coalition; the second was a strengthening of sectorial factors that threatened the secular-bourgeoisie hegemony. The first change weakened the coalition's inherent resistance to the constitutionalization of the political system and the second change neutralized the institutional interest of the Knesset members representing the old-elites against the constitutional project.
A close examination of the four abovementioned theses leads to the conclusion that none of them on its own may adequately account for what occurred in Israel, yet there is compelling logic in the claim that each of the four explanations made its contribution to the success of the Israeli Constitutional Revolution.
B. A HISTORICAL MOMENT
Bruce Ackerman proposed dividing the history of the democratic process into two temporal categories. 13 Most political epochs are characterized by ongoing regular democratic process, but some of them feature a sharpened public awareness of the decisive importance of the burning constitutional issues of the day. During the latter, the publics' voting patterns do not express their concerns relating to everyday politics but rather its intelligent assessment of the constitutional issues at the forefront of public attention. Ackerman uses this distinction inter alia to explain and justify, from a democratic perspective, several constitutional changes, experienced by the United States as a result of Supreme Court decisions, which were not anchored in a formal constitutional amendment.
The most striking among these changes was the Court's reversal of attitude to initiatives led by President Roosevelt in the thirties of the twentieth century in response to the grave economic crisis that beset the United States. For a number of years the Court had blocked these initiatives, systematically overturning a series of laws intended to give them effect. At a certain point in time though, the Court suddenly changed its tune, and began to validate laws that it had struck down just a short time earlier. One of the explanations for this reversal was the Court's fear of a possible assault on its independence. Ackerman claims that the reason for the change lies elsewhere, not in judicial surrender, but rather in the Court's awareness of and response to a constitutional change that had overtaken the United States. 14 Ackerman asserts that the Presidential elections of 1936 were conducted during a time of "constitutional 13 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991 Ackerman's theory is primarily descriptive, but it also contains a normative aspect. It does not only explain the change in the approach of the Supreme Court, but also justifies it. The
Court's amendment of the constitution is problematic, and becomes all the more so in view of the fact that the constitution establishes a clear and different mechanism for its change. 16 The claim that the constitutional change was not the result of a judicial resolution but was rather a public decision, resolves at least part of the problem.
17
The factual details of Ackerman's theory do not fully square with the Israeli reality. In contrast to the American example, in Israel the constitutional change was not the result of a conflict between the court and the political system, nor did it originate after the public expressed its view in the elections. Implementation of Ackerman's theory in the Israeli context might take the following path:
During the eighties and the early nineties, a series of morally and politically problematic issues triggered extensive and intensive public distrust, if not to say disgust with the entire political system. The result was the emergence of broad public consensus in support of a deep and systemic revamping of the political system as a precondition for solving the crisis. This engendered two profound and far-reaching changes. The first change was in the relationship between the legislature and the executive branch, with the transition from the model of parliamentary democracy to a hybrid model comprising features of the presidential model, which intended to strengthen the standing of the government and its leader. 20 The second innovation related to the relationship between the legislature and the Court, expressing itself in the adoption of the Basic Laws that enable Supreme Court supervision of value based, legislative decisions. According to this line of argument, the new Basic Laws were the direct result of the crisis that beset the Israeli political system, and the public recognition of the dire need for change.
21
Ackerman's theory is complex, and involves more than just the moment of constitutional politics. In fact it comprises a four tiered system of constitutional change. REV. 309, 351-352 (1995) 22 Ackerman, supra, n. 13, that same initiative by another branch of government. The third stage is the decision making stage, which is accompanied by public discussion. The public's position will determine whether initiative for constitutional change is to be crowned with success or doomed to failure. Where the change merits public support, the particular branch of government opposing it will withdraw its opposition, and if it does not support the change, the initiative will fail and the existing constitutional regime will remain unchanged. This complex system is of importance both in the descriptive and the normative sense. The head on collision between the court and the political system is a decisive factor in the creation and stimulation of public awareness. Conducting elections in the shadow of a focused debate provides normative justification for constitutional change. Concededly, this process need not be precisely replicated in order to testify to public involvement and thereby justify the constitutional change in its wake, but absent that kind of framework it becomes necessary to point to another indicator attesting to the constitutional moment and the public support for the process of change.
It is difficult to point out a clear indication of a constitutional moment in Israel, which preceded the adoption of the Basic Laws, and which evidenced a broad base of public support. The claim of a crisis of trust between the public and the political system during the relevant period, appears to be substantiated, 23 but there is no support for the assertion that the ramifications of the constitutional revolution were presented, and discussed, and that they received broad public support prior to the Knesset vote on the adoption of the new Basic freedom of expression, and equality were omitted from the Basic Laws, or removed from them during the negotiation stages. In addition to agreement on the provisional removal of some of the rights, the same writers point to a number of other concessions intended to allay the fears of the religious front, which had traditionally opposed the anchoring of human rights in a Basic Law.
30
There are those who are rather skeptical regarding the sincerity of the intentions of the laws' initiators to compromise. 31 But either way, today it is crystal clear that irrespective of their degree of sincerity, the Israeli Supreme Court rendered the compromise meaningless. The Court adopted a strategy that enabled it to read all of the missing rights into the language of the Basic Laws. 32 The conduit chosen by the Court to do this was the term "Human Dignity", and the interpretative method presented in the effort to justify the judicial broadening of the ambit was that of "purposive interpretation", as conceived by President Aharon Barak. ISRAEL, 323, 338 (1993) [Hebrew]; Rubinstein, supra, n. 24 at 340 ("How is it that despite everything, a basic law as important as Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty came into being? How is that the Knesset, at a unique hour of grace, accepted these laws, after all the previous attempts had shattered on the rocks of political and religious opposition. It should immediately be said that had the draft bill not been split up into four separate draft bills, then entrenched human rights in the Twelfth Knesset would have had the same fate as in the previous Knessets".) 30 See Rubinstein, id. at 346. 31 See for example Karp, supra n. 29 at 358 ("Conceivably, supporters of the law supported it because of their assumption that the omission with respect to the equality section would be filled in by the court by force of interpretation or judicial innovation, which would rely on the basic principles of the system. Over the years however, the position of those supporting the broad reading gradually became the dominant position. To date, the Court has yet to strike down legislation by reason of a contradiction between the provision and unenumerated rights, but the obiter dicta of countless judgments has rendered these rights a part of Israeli Constitutional Law.
36
According to the explanation being examined, the consent of the traditional opponents of the constitution to support the Basic Laws was based on their understanding that it represented a compromise, in the framework of which the problematic rights had been deleted from the proposal, and only those acceptable to all were retained. However, this explanation too has its difficulties. Even if the particularly problematic rights, such as freedom of religion and equality, were omitted from the Basic Law, the consent to the anchoring of the rights which were included in the Basic Laws is far from simple. What reason could the religious Knesset
Members have had for waiving their principled and sweeping opposition to the enactment of a bill of rights? One view is that the religious consent is a result of the fact that the Basic Laws also anchored the Jewish character of the State. 37 However, even were we to agree that the aforementioned anchoring of the Jewish character of the State carried a certain weight in background, I doubt whether it is possible -or at least, whether it is proper -to hold by means of construction that the purpose of the Basic Law is to provide constitutional protection to the principle of general equality."); HCJ 4463/94 Golan v. Prison Service, 50 (4) P.D. 136,191 (Freedom of Expression) ("Apparently, the national consensus required for enshrining freedom of speech in a Basic Law had not yet been reached, and the draft Basic Law: Freedom of Speech has not been enacted until today. In such circumstances, it seems doubtful to me whether it is possible, or at any rate appropriate, to confer super-legislative status on freedom of speech generally, by incorporating it in the right of dignity.") For support of the determination that the original intention was unequivocal, see Karp, supra n. 29. As an attorney working in the public service, Karp was deeply involved in the legislative process of the Basic Law in its numerous permutations, and she contends that: " What was done and what was said attests to a shared presumption (of those supporting the inclusion of equality in the Basic Law and those opposing its inclusion) that the omission of the equality clause would be constructed as excluding it from the Basic Law." id., at 358.) 35 For an attempt to define the originalist conception, Knesset Member Lin further stated:
The authority was not transferred to the judicial system. The authority remains in this house. And if heaven forbid our experience with this law shows that we made a mistake, and that the interpretation given to this law is incongruous with the legislator's original intention, then the Knesset has the ability to change the law. . . . I oppose the establishment of a constitutional court because I think that it confers far reaching powers to a small group of judges whose interpretation will determine the deletion of laws in Israel.
40
38 See for example, the following expressions: "On a certain day, or more correctly -night, in an atmosphere totally devoid of any festivity, two laws were submitted to vote, and less than half of the House members were present… nobody mentioned that this was a constituent assembly, nobody said that this was a revolution, and nobody said that any constitutional change was underway. Then they voted. A few months later they informed the people: a revolution had taken place. Nu, this was the first revolution that took place without the public being aware of it. Only after the fact was it informed of the revolution…those Knesset members who perhaps knew that this was a far reaching step, intentionally hid that information from the other Knesset members… this is how one builds a constitution? Why was it necessary to deceive the Knesset members?" (M.K. Michael Eitan, Knesset Protocols 16.1.95) "In the previous Knesset, already late at night, the Basic Laws were passed. These were the Basic Laws that were supposed to be adopted in the full plenum of 120 Knesset members. This is the festive day for democracy when the constitution is adopted late at night, while intentionally deceiving the religious and ultra-orthodox public, whose consent they required in the previous Knesset session…" (M. The compromise thesis discussed above dealt with a compromise on the contents of the constitution, a compromise that was not honored by the Supreme Court. Its veracity may impugn the legitimacy of the constitutional enterprise and its consequences, but in my view it
does not lead to its categorical invalidation. Conceivably the constitutional history of other democracies contains no parallel example of such blatant judicial disregard for the constitutive intention so soon after the adoption of the constitution. But there are definitely cases in which over the years the court interpreted the constitution in a manner that deviates from the original intention of its drafters. 41 Those who in principle reject judicial intervention in the formulation of the constitution will certainly berate the conduct of the Israeli Supreme Court, and even those supporting such intervention as a matter of principle may nevertheless have reservations in the Israeli context due to the head-on confrontation between the legislative intention and interpretation given by the Supreme Court, especially given the chronological proximity between the two. Nonetheless, the difference between constitutional judicial legislation in Israel and constitutional judicial legislation in other countries is one of degree only. On the other hand, the deception thesis, presuming its validity, challenges the fundamental validity of the new Basic Laws. The challenge to their validity does not flow from the immoral nature of the deception, but rather from its consequences: What possible validity can a document referred to as a 'constitution' have if adopted under circumstances in which a significant portion of its supporters were unaware that they were actually voting for a constitution? To the best of my knowledge, no precedent exists in any democratic state for a process in which the court determines post-facto that a constitution was adopted under circumstances in which a significant number of those who supported it were in fact unaware 41 For example, in France, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic of 1958 does not include a bill of human rights, but its preface refers to the proclamation of 1789, and to its confirmation and completion in the preface to the 1946 constitution. In 1970 the French Government prohibited the establishment of a leftist political party, relying on the 1936 law which banned the existence of private militias. In response, a group of citizens established a an association going by the name of the newspaper of a party that had been outlawed. The Minister of the Interior gave instructions not to recognize the party. His decision was overturned by the Administrative Court, in reliance on clear precedents of the Supreme Administrative Court. In response, the Government passed a law that vested the registrar with the authority to refuse to register an association that "appeared to have an immoral or illicit purpose or to be trying to reconstitute an illegal association". The President of the Supreme Court submitted a query to Constitutional Committee, claiming that the law contravened the provision of s. 4 of the Constitution which provided that parties and political groups could associate and operate freely. The Constitutional Council struck down the law by a majority of 6 against three, but its decision was not based on section 4, but rather on the preface to the Constitution which in the Council's view had introduced the Either way, our concern is not with the normative implications of various explanations for the success of the constitutional proceeding in 1992 but rather with the explanations themselves.
On this level, the deception thesis is marred by a certain weakness. For even if the initiators of the legislation attempted to camouflage the real significance of the proceeding, is it possible that the traditional opponents were really unable to see through the smokescreen?
Even if we accept the claim that the average Israeli politician is occupied primarily with survival, and is less concerned with parliamentary work that requires knowledge and understanding, the starting point of our discussion was that previous attempts to anchor human rights in Basic Laws failed precisely because of their opponents' awareness of the far reaching implications of such legislation. It is difficult to accept that the 1992 Knesset was ignorant to the extent of being gullible enough to buy that which had not been sellable to its predecessors. ("It is undisputed that as a rule, the validity of Knesset legislation is not subject to judicial review, apart from exceptional cases in which secondary legislation is enacted in contravention of the "entrenchment" of a Basic Law. In the latter case, the validity of the legislation is subject to judicial review, and should it be found that it was enacted in contravention of the entrenchment in the law, the Court will declare that the legislation was illegally enacted." Id. The claim of deception and mistake in the strong sense encounters a number of factual difficulties, but a somewhat toned down version might be more convincing. The weakness of the deception/mistake claim derives to a certain extent from a skewered understanding of the events of 1992, when viewed purely from the perspective of today's reality. We must however be careful to avoid that kind of anachronism. Certain legal-constitutional realities of which the contemporary Israeli law student has precise knowledge were altogether unknown Constitutional Revolution, 28 MISHPATIM, 149, 166-167 (1997) [Hebrew] . 58 This is the only way of understanding the following kind of statements made by M.K. Levi, where he relates to the meaning of the limitation clause proposed for Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation: "The question is how does one understand the section. One interpretation would be that the law is a law, and this Basic Law does not presume to limit any other law….the other possibility is to say that …here we are qualifying other laws, and declaring that the laws will be examined, and if they contain elements that are not in the public interest, then the Basic Law will prevail. …My understanding is that this Basic Law does not purport to cancel any other law" Israel's Written Constitution, 5 HAMISHPAT 267 (2000) [Hebrew] ("There was not a single member of the Constitution Committee who was unaware that the two Basic Laws conferred the judiciary with authority for judicial review over any legislation that infringes basic rights under those laws, including regular legislation of the Knesset itself. The debate was not over whether the court could invalidate a regular law, but rather whether the authority for judicial review should be limited to the Supreme Court or given to the entire judicial system. The decision was in favor of the entire judiciary. The legislature's intention was to create protected basic rights. The limitation clause which enumerated conditions for assessing the validity of a regular law would be legally meaningless in the absence of the power of judicial review." Id. at 277) In an article published by Lynn just after the enactment of the Basic Laws he makes no reference to the deception claim, apparently because it had not yet been made. See Uriel Lynn, A Foundation for a Written Constitution in Israel, 1 HAMISHPAT 81 (1993) [Hebrew] . 61 I think that this conclusion is unavoidable, having consideration for the particular context. Lynn's position as quoted in the body of the text was made first expressed in the deliberations of the Constitution Committee, in response to the M.K. Ravitz's proposal to include an explicit provision in the Basic Law stating that it would not affect arrangements of matters relating to marriages and divorces and matters of Sabbath and the Festivals. Lin's reply to this was that the matter was negotiable but "it must be remembered that the big difference between this Basic Law and the other laws which you have been considering is the establishment of the Supreme Court as the Constitutional Court. In all of those draft bills the Supreme Court received the power to invalidate laws. Here we are not dealing with this subject. Here we are not giving that power to the Supreme Court" (Protocols of deliberations in the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, 9.3.1992, p.34) . It is clear that in these comments Lynn was attempting to appease Ravitz, and to explain to him why legislation dealing with Shabbat or Festivals, or personal status, whether existing or future could not be harmed by the Court. If Lynn's intention was only to say that the Supreme Court would not be vested with any exclusive authority, then his comments would not have provided any kind of answer to Ravitz's concerns.
yet to be seriously discussed. It is more logical to presume that listeners understood Lin's comments according to their simple meaning.
Further support for a softened version of the deception claim can be found in the pronouncements of jurists in the aftermath of the adoption of the Basic Laws. As is well known, in the landmark Bank Mizrachi case, adjudicated a long time after President Barak and others had begun enlisting support for the idea of a constitutional revolution, Justice
Cheshin adamantly argued his view that the Basic Laws were without constitutional validity. 62 
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A tempered version of the deception/mistake thesis is required not only because the conduct of the religious Knesset members fails to substantiate the thesis in its extreme form, but because of the need to consider an additional factor, the influence of which on the constitutional revolution I have only mentioned incidentally until now. I am referring to the court. In his academic writings Barak claims that "the revolutionary body that executed the revolution was the Knesset itself, and the revolution was executed in compliance with all of the rules and laws that are definitive of the revolution itself. This was a constitutional 'constitutional revolution'." 70 However, even according to Barak, the Knesset activity was a necessary but not sufficient condition for the occurrence of that revolution. In his own words, "the constitutional revolution became possible in 1992 by virtue of the cooperation between the constituent authority and the judicial authority. Neither of the two authorities could have produced the revolution alone. It was only the unifying of forces between the Knesset and the court that actually lead to the constitutional revolution". 71 For our purposes, even if the success of Rubinstein, Lin, and their colleagues was facilitated by their failure to make the effort to fully explain the revolutionary potential of their initiative, they could not have succeeded without the tight co-operation, (perhaps even complicity), on the part of the court.
Having consideration for their professional and personal familiarity with the judges, it may reasonably be presumed that the laws' initiators anticipated the judges' cooperation in 67 The best proof of the connection between the M.Ks's awareness of the importance of the Basic Laws and the degree of participation in voting, is the high degree of participation in the vote conducted later regarding the amendment of the Basic Laws. 68 D.K. 124 (1992) 2596 69 Klein, supra n.12 at 23. 70 Aharon Barak, The Law of Israel: Past, Present, and Future 43 HAPRAKLT 5 (1997) [Hebrew] . supra n. 11 at 19. advance. But apparently, even they never imagined just how much cooperation they would actually receive. Did they imagine that the rights that they were compelled to waive would find their way into the Basic Laws by force of court rulings? Did it ever occur to them that the enactment of the Basic Laws would induce the court to proclaim a general upgrading of all the old Basic Laws? In short, did they anticipate that the court would use the new Basic Law in a manner that would effectively obviate the need for any additional legislative activity? Presumably, the answer to these questions is in the negative. 72 The conclusion is therefore that even if the initiators of the law had properly disclosed their intentions they with an interest in the process is the legislature. The legislature's vested interest is against an entrenched bill of rights, which severely curtails its powers. As a means of neutralizing this and other problematic interests, Elster proposes that the constitution be adopted by an ad hoc body, to be disbanded immediately upon completing its task. By definition, such a body would be free of institutional and other problematic interests.
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Elster's thesis provides a possible explanation for the failure to adopt a Constitution upon the establishment of the State of Israel. As mentioned, the Israeli Declaration of Independence promised the enactment of a constitution, and actually prescribed a procedure for its enactment. Elections would be held for the Constituent Assembly; the Assembly would then enact a Constitution and having discharged its one and only duty, would disperse; Elections to the legislature would then be conducted on the basis of the arrangement established by the Constitution. This scenario is consistent with Elster's proposal that the constitution should be adopted by a body established uniquely and specifically for that purpose, after which it should dissolve. However, the reality that transpired was different. The Provisional Council of State, which functioned as interim legislature, voluntarily dispersed and transferred its powers to the Constituent Assembly and thus the Constituent Assembly summarily collapsed into a legislature. 75 According to Elster's thesis, at that moment the Constituent Assembly also became a party with an embedded structural interest against the adoption of a constitution. This factor provides an additional, cumulative explanation for failure of the first Knesset, as well as of the subsequent Knesset's failure to enact a Constitution.
Assuming that the institutional interest did not disappear and that the division along coalitionopposition lines did not change, it turns that the 1992 success required not only a victory over those whose opposition was content-based, but also over the ingrained interests of the coalition, and to a certain extent even of the Knesset as a whole, against the anchoring of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution. How can we explain the 1992 success in contrast with the previous failures?
The triumph over the coalition parties' inbuilt opposition to the enactment of a bill of rights that would curtail its powers can be explained as the result of a change in the relations between the political powers in Israel. This change began to surface towards the end of the 1970s. Until then, the Israeli political system had enjoyed stability. The ruling party's identity 74 See Elster, supra n. 6 at 395 ("To reduce the scope for institutional interest, constitutions ought to be written by specially convened assemblies and not by bodies that also serve as ordinary legislatures"). 75 See Gavison, The Constitutional Revolution, supra n. 4 at 75. was known in advance and even its partners in government were more or less fixed.
However, since the elections to the ninth Knesset, which were held in 1977, and until today, the Israeli political system has been characterized by fluctuation and mutability. Governments can and do change hands and no party holding the reins of power can guarantee the longevity of its tenure. 76 A governing party firmly established in power would be loath to lend a hand to the weakening of the parliament under its control. On the other hand, a ruling party that in the near future might very well become an opposition party will have no strong interest militating against the adoption of a constitution. According to this explanation the Knesset's institutional interest did not disappear, but under certain circumstances which we will immediately address, a significant portion of Knesset members orchestrated a decision that would operate against their own institutional interest in order to bolster the power of the court.
The past few decades the political system in Israel have been characterized not only by fluctuations in the identities of the ruling parties, but also in the diminishing influence of the "political centre" and increasing potency of factors that were once located at the periphery.
The veteran parties have become progressively weaker in contrast with the nascence and growing empowerment of sectorial parties. 78 The hegemony of the secular-Jewish-veteran center comprising moderates of the left and the right is in jeopardy. As a result, members of this group fear the prospect of a dramatic change in the character of the State as a result of the nerve centers of political power coming under the control of peripheral forces with value systems alien to that of the secular-center. In a political-cultural atmosphere of serious 76 Beginning as of the second half of the seventies, cracks began to appear in the hegemony of Labor party which had ruled in the Yishuv and in the State, until that time. A clear transition point to the new era was the upheaval of 1977, in which the Labor party lost its power over Government which it had held until that time.
The new post-hegemony era was characterized by the split of political power between different parties, none of which had political hegemony. Elyon, 8 AZURE 54, 61-65 (1999) . Over the last few years fissures are beginning to appear in this conventional understanding, and the Supreme Court justices are increasingly confronting Ministers of Justice who are unwilling to be submissive. 80 For a similar argument see Mautner, supra n.76 (in the wake of the lost autonomy and the struggle over the characterization of Israel, members of the old elites classes find themselves in a state of anxiety which has compelled them increasingly to rely upon the colleagues in the Supreme Court, and to the non-critical acquiescence that has characterized their response to the changes in the rulings of the Supreme Court during the eighties 1819, 1833-1847 (2004) explanation is persuasive in the Israeli context, given its unusual and exceptional system of judicial appointments. On the other hand, the attempt to transform this local explanation into a general theory for explaining parallel processes in other states is less convincing, inter alia because of its disregard for the accepted judicial selection mechanisms in the majority of states, which confer the political system influence if not control over the judicial output.
Under circumstances in which the political system controls judicial selections, the transfer of authority to the court serves the threatened elites for a short period only, whereas in the longterm it may transpire to be particularly dangerous. REV. 755, 764 (2006) ("the best the displaced coalition's leaders can hope for is that their partisans in the courts will be able to delay and smooth out the transition between one constitutional order and the next."
Which of the explanations is the "correct" one? In my view, notwithstanding the passage of only 15 years since the enactment of the Basic Laws, the evidence on the matter is insufficient for purposes of giving a categorical answer. However even were I equipped to offer a definite opinion I am uncertain as to whether it is possible to identify a single explanation as the correct one. There is compelling logic in the claim that each of the four explanations made its contribution to the success of the legislation. The crisis of public faith in the political system generated public pressure on the Knesset, causing the legislators themselves to appreciate the need for change. The tactics of atomizing the bill of rights into its separate components, and the willingness to negotiate assuaged the opposition of its traditional opponents. Intentional ambiguity and ambivalent pronouncements on the part of the initiators of the law was complemented by the vagueness of constitutional doctrines and widespread public ignorance of constitutional matters at that time, and specifically among Knesset members. These were all factors that blurred the revolutionary potential of the basic laws, lulling their opponents into complacency. Finally there were the fears of the old elites of their hegemony, and the fluctuation that typified the governmental system beginning as of the end of the 70s. The effect of the latter two factors was to neutralize the institutional interest of certain Knesset members and the interest of those holding the reins of power against the transferring the focus of power to the court. Moreover, they reinforced the sense of urgency felt by the initiators of the law. Summing up, I suggest that the enactment of the basic laws was the product of the merging of all these elements. However, the combined operation of all these elements was unable to transform the basic laws into what they have become today -a fully fledged Bill of Rights. The completion of that task was the product of a dominant and determined court 83 and a weak and hesitant legislature, but this narrative will be dealt with in another forum.
